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SURVEY SECTION
Employment Law. Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 790 A.2d 368
(R.I. 2002). Injury to an employee's reputation is not an injury for
which compensation is available under the Workers' Compensation
Act. Therefore, the Act does not bar a defamed employee from
prosecuting a common law claim seeking damages for an alleged
injury to his reputation.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Richard T. Nassa was an assistant vice president of real estate
for Hook-SupeRx (Hook).' Two of Hook's employees, a vice presi-
dent and a construction manager, told several of Hook's employees
and outside property owners looking to do business with Hook that
Nassa required a "kickback" from property owners before they
would be able to procure a lease with Hook. 2 Nassa claimed that
as a result of these false claims, Hook both damaged his reputation
and fired him, causing him to lose wages. 3 Nassa filed a superior
court action against Hook and several codefendants alleging that,
among other things, they had defamed him.4 The defendants ar-
gued that the Workers' Compensation Act's (WCA) exclusive-rem-
edy provision barred the claims, and moved for partial judgment
on most of the pleadings.5 The motion justice granted defendants'
motion and dismissed several of the counts, including the defama-
tion count.6 Nassa appealed, challenging only the court's dismissal
of the defamation counts.7
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The issue in this case was a question of first impression in
Rhode Island: does the exclusive-remedy provision of the WCA bar
work-related defamation claims filed by employees against their
employers?8 Section 28-29-20 of the WCA, the exclusive-remedy
provision, provides "The right to compensation for an injury under
chapters 29-38 of this title, and the remedy for it granted by those
1. Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 790 A.2d 368, 370 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-29-20 (2000)).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 369.
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chapters, shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that in-
jury now existing.... .9
Defendants argued that the Rhode Island Supreme Court had
previously held that intentional infliction of emotional distress and
invasion of privacy claims were subject to the WCA's exclusive-
remedy provision. 10 Therefore, the defendants argued, work-re-
lated defamation claims were also subject to the WCA's exclusive-
remedy provision." The supreme court agreed that there are some
instances where the WCA provides benefits for an employee's disa-
bling mental injury,12 however, they wrote, there are certain work-
related "intangible" injuries, such as discrimination, that do not
fall within the WCA's exclusive-remedy provision because the in-
jury is unrelated to the employee's capacity to perform his employ-
ment-related duties. 13 The court found defamation to be one such
injury. 14
Defamation, the court wrote, robs the employee of his good
name in the community and adversely affects the employee's fit-
ness to conduct business without affecting their capacity to men-
tally or physically do the work required of them. 15 Therefore, a
defamed person may maintain the physical and mental capacity to
carry out his job duties, yet maintain a common-law defamation
claim for his injured reputation.' 6 Accordingly, the court held that
"the WCA was not enacted to redress such 'intangible injuries' to
reputation, nor would it 'serve as a deterrent' in that regard."17 In
such a case, the employee is free to bring a defamation suit at com-
mon law."'
CONCLUSION
Damage to an employee's reputation does not fall within the
Workers' Compensation Act's purview and no Workers' Compensa-
9. Id. at 371 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-29-20 (2000)).
10. Id. at 372.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 373.
13. Id. at 374.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Folan v. State Dep't of Children, Youth, & Families, 723 A.2d
287 (R.I. 1999)).
18. Id.
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tion Act remedy is available to compensate such an injury. Under
these circumstances, the employee is free to bring a defamation
suit at common law to redress such wrongs.
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